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Abstract.  Uncertainty  means  partially  or  totally  knowing  the  probabilities  to  
accomplish an action’s potential results.  
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Economic decision making is the action direction chosen consciously when managing 
an enterprise among a certain number of possibilities with the purpose to achieve goals in 
maximum efficiency contexts.   
When  trying  to  formalize  economic  behaviour,  it  is  essential  that  facts  should  be 
inserted  about  uncertainty’s  being inseparable  from human thinking  and dominating  most 
judgments.    Since one should give up the objective measure concept,  there has to be an 
assessment, comparison, graduation or relation. Incorporating these concepts with subjective 
nature is a basic activity for the better knowledge of the analyzed phenomenon. Thus, a state 
which cannot be measured but preferred to another goes up to a higher knowledge level [5].
A model of economic decision making in uncertainty conditions can only be drafted 
by  including  the  utility  function.  It  is  based  on  organizing  decision  maker’s  preferences 
according to the risk he/she associates with the set of pursued goals. 
Let us consider the mere case of selection decisions of one potential variant out of 
two. The former utility concept used is ”ordinal utility” [10], which has the exclusive task to 
arrange preferences without specifying how high the utility of the formerly selected variant is 
as compared to the utility of the latter variant. The latter concept is ”cardinal utility” [10] 
which  states  the  idea  that  the  utility  difference  of  the  two variants  might  have  a  certain 
significance. Decision making means stating that a certain variant has a higher utility than 
another one. 
Consumers’  preferences  and  their  related  utilities  are  the  nucleus  of  an  uncertain 
economy. In order to understand how preferences form, it is fundamental the notion of nature 
state should be defined [1] – the potential  configuration of decisional environment which, 
along with knowing individual actions, entirely causes all consequences. Uncertainty is found 
in the fact that one can never tell which state is going to intervene. That particular state shall 
be precisely known subsequently and one shall consider uncertainty being solved entirely at 
that time. 
Uncertainty can be specified by means of probabilities’ theory. The expected utility is 
defined  as  a  probabilistic  construction  where  the  ”expectation”  operates  by including  the 
uncertainty due to  nature states.  The theory of  expected  utility  was  originally  created  by 
Bernoulli, and the axiomatic growth was stated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944. 
Therefore,  utility  function  is  defined  on  the  set  of  goods1,  not  on  the  corresponding 
1 « Goods » generically mean the complete list of products, services, revenue or time units involved in decision 
making, Bogdan-Constantin Andronic, Company Performance, Polirom Publishing House, Iaşi, 2000, p. 157
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configurations.  Arranging  preferences  is  done  according  to  the  expected  value  of  utility 
function.  
In uncertain conditions, events are the potential states of nature and therefore decision 
making involves considering their ( )ixp  probabilities meaning a unit partition. The amount 
of average information a decision maker receives is the well-balanced average of information 
amounts that each nature state associates with ( )ixp  probabilities and it bears the name of 
informational entropy which is a concept defined by Shannon, involving probabilities both in 
the stage of information spring seen as a random process, and in the stage of gathering the 
results of transformations upon information. 
Let 
( )
mii
i
xp
x
x
,1=




= , 1
1
=∑
=
m
i
ip
be a discrete random variable with ix  values. A Shannon mere entropy associated with x 
random variable or probabilistic repartition ( )mpppP ,...,, 21=  [189] is the expression: 
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Defining entropy according to the amount of information, to the information based on 
probabilities and taking account of the fact that probabilities’ classical theory is one of the 
methods to approach decision making in uncertain conditions make entropy an operational 
instrument for decision making when uncertainty is present. 
Decisional subjectivity corresponds to uncertainty when either the chances of nature 
states’ occurrence cannot be objectively assessed – partial uncertainty, or there are no data on 
nature  states  –  pure  uncertainty.  The  preferences  associated  with  each  decision  maker 
intervene in both situations. 
There  are  two  main  categories  of  subjective  influences  upon  individual  decision 
making:  
• The influences exerted by other players of decision making; 
• Subjective probabilities. 
According  to  Knight  [6],  the  first  category  includes  involvement  as  a  measure  of 
existing internal and external concerns, direction which can generate conflicts due to 
divergent trends and the way to exert authority. 
Among the elements in the process of subjective estimation of decisional probabilities, 
one should mention the decreasing balance of remote events in a geometrical progression, the 
selective  perception  of  reality,  the varying  degree of information’s  representativeness,  the 
scope of decision making reasonableness concept. Decisional reasonableness is regarded in 
three ways: logically – subject to the principles of decisional identity, excluded third party 
and sufficient reasoning - , informationally – a decision may seem irrational if its assessor 
does not have the additional information that a decision maker has – and the regulatory and 
social  way  –  the  rules  of  economic  behaviour  are  regarded  as  restrictions  by  economic 
decision making.    
Several  specifications  have  been  made  regarding  significant  parties,  making 
generalization come true [3] in terms of probabilities’ subjective approach: 
• Decision makers estimate that an event which has not occurred within a longer period 
of time has higher occurrence probability in the future; 
• Decion makers overestimate the probabilities of favourable events and underestimate 
the probabilities of unfavourable ones;  
• Decision makers tend to overestimate the occurrence of low probability events and 
underestimate the occurrence of events having high emergence probability.  
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If nature is one of the participants, decision making can enter the realm of uncertainty 
when there are no data about the probabilities to achieve nature states.  
Decisional matters in uncertain conditions can be settled by several criteria:  
1. The pessimistic criterion (the rule of Abraham Wald – 1950)
It starts from the idea that the best variant is the one supposing maximum advantages when 
optimal conditions are most unfavourable. Thus, considering the decisional matrix such as:
ji CV 1C          2C …………. nC
1V
2V
-
-
-
-
-
nV
11R        12R ………… R1n
21R        22R …………. nR2
-              -                     -
-              -                     -
-              -                     -
-              -                     -
-              -                     -
1mR        2mR                 mnR  
where:   iV  – decisional variant;
iC  – nature’s objective state;
ijR  – decisional consequence related to variant i and objective state j.
The strategy chosen corresponds to value ( )ijjiopt RV minmax=
or,  in  other  words,  the  possible  minimum  efficiency  maximizes.  Some  authors  [48]  also 
identify a choice for exceedingly prudent managers: = ijji Rv minmin . It is thought that such 
prudence can be associated to small companies whose survival depends on the size of losses. 
2.  The  optimistic  criterion  aims  at  choosing  the  optimal  variant  when  optimal 
conditions are most favourable. ( )ijjiopt RV maxmax=
3.  The  criterion  of  average  optimism  (the  rule  of  Leonid  Hurwicz  –  1951) 
associates each strategy with a pair of complementary probabilities ( )121 =+ pp  so that 1p  
should describe the most advantageous situation and  2p  the least advantageous one.  1p
coefficient is also called players’ optimism. Applying the criterion supposes several iterations: 
• adopting optimism coefficient:
10 1 << p
• setting up iH  elements according to the formula: 
( ) iii apApH 11 1−+=
where: iA  – the element of maximum utility; 
                      ia  – the element of minimum utility on each line; 
• choosing  the  best  variant  which  corresponds to  the  variant  having  the 
highest iH :
iiopt
HV max=
It is important to notice that if extreme values are given to 1p optimism coefficient, one 
reaches the solutions given by the pessimistic ( )01 =p  or optimistic criterion ( )11 =p :
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iiii AaAH =⋅+⋅= 01
ijjiiopt
RAV maxmaxmax ==
iiii aaAH =⋅+⋅= 10
ijjiiopt
RaV minmaxmax ==
The result  of  this  criterion  depends on the value of optimism coefficient  which is 
closely  related  to  decision  makers’  behaviour.  By  comparing iH  values,  the  optimism 
coeficient can be set up which involves the fact that a variant becomes more preferred than 
another.  It  is  interesting  that  if  a  strategy  corresponds  to  more  than  two  decisional 
consequences  leaving  the  most  advantageous  and  disadvantageous  ones  aside,  the  others 
receive  zero  obtaining  probability.  According  to  Hurwicz’s  criterion,  a  decision  maker 
behaves as if there were only two potential extreme manifestations. 
4. The proportionality criterion  stated by  Bayes – Laplace  in 1825 starts from the 
idea that each state of objective conditions has the same occurrence probability and the best 
variant is the one for which the mathematical average of results corresponding to the considered 
state is most favourable.  
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5.  The  criterion  to  minimize  regrets  stated  by  Leonard  F. Savage  –  1951.  A 
strategy must  be  therefore  chosen after  assessing the  difference  between the  best  result’s 
value corresponding to nature state and the other results’ value according to which the best 
variant is the one involving the least regret.  
This criterion’s functioning involves: 
• setting  the  regrets’  matrices  where  every  element  is  obtained  by 
subtracting the maximum element in the column from its original value 
(the regrets’ matrix is obtained according to the dimensional matrix).  
ijjijij
RRr max−=
• setting the maximum values of regrets  obtained  and,  among them,  the 
minimum value in each variant.  ( )ijjiopt rV maxmin= .
This criterion applies to certain investment projects during a longer period of time. 
 Numerical application exemplifying the five decisional criteria: 
A large-size commercial company manufacturing basic food products, non-food products and 
related services wants to market its goods following the alternatives below:  
 direct sales in its own stores; 
 sales by means of intermediaries; 
 sales on foreign markets. 
Taking account of the domestic and foreign markets’ conjecture, the following profit 
growth rates are estimated by product categories and sale methods.  
        Nature states
Variant
Own stores Sales by 
intermediaries
Sales on foreign 
markets
Food products 10 6 - 3
Non-food products 15 - 9 2
Services 18 4 2
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1. The pessimistic criterion:
        max (-3, -9, -5) = -3
          best variant – selling food products on foreign markets.
2. The optimistic criterion:
max{10, 15, 18} = 18
best variant – selling services in own stores.
3. The criterion of average optimism:
a) 1p  = 0,5
b) ( )( )[ ] 5,35,1535,05,0101 =−=−⋅+⋅=H
c) ( )( )[ ] 35,45,795,05,0152 =−=−⋅+⋅=H
d) ( )( )[ ] 5,65,2955,05,0183 =−=−⋅+⋅=H
{ } 5,65,6;3;5,3max ==optV
3VVopt =
4. The proportionality criterion:
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